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Languages, Political Cultures and Solidarity in Europe 
 
Jean-Claude Barbier1 
Jean-Claude Barbier is a senior CNRS researcher (sociology) at the University of Paris 1 (Panthéon-
Sorbonne); he is currently a member of the Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne. He conducts extensive 
comparative research on social protection systems, especially in Europe, and in the context of the 
various co-ordinations of social policy (including in particular employment policies) at the EU level. 
His research interests also include epistemological and methodological issues of the very practice of 
comparison. His latest publication is La longue marche vers l’Europe sociale (Paris, PUF, 2008), to 
be adapted and published as The Long Road to Social Europe: A contemporary approach to political 
cultures and diversity in the EU, by Routledge in 2012. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
One crucial reason why systems of social protection have remained essentially 
national is that these systems are bounded empirically (by territory, history and 
language) and are based on ‘bonds’ which are essential for the actual and 
situated exercise of politics (citizenship law, reciprocity and identification). 
Politics in Europe means the use of diverse languages, and there is no 
imaginable way of circumventing this empirical fact of democracy. At the same 
time, the politicization of cross-EU matters is increasing. Hence, understanding 
how solidarity fares and will fare across the EU members has to be firmly based 
on the understanding of the social processes at the national level, and should 
situate them in the wider polity of European integration. It is precisely at a time – 
the present crisis – when élites have really started, albeit reluctantly, to try and 
‘jump over their shadows’ (‘über ihren Schatten springen’, to use Jürgen 
Habermas’ expression), that they are confronted most importantly with the 
language issue and the tenacious resilience of political cultures, and, so far, they 
have doggedly endeavoured to ignore it. 
 
In the midst of the most serious crisis experienced since the Second World War, all the 
member states in the European Union are acting to deal with the dire problems affecting 
their economy and their population, their political system and their politics. Contrary to the 
assumption that nation-states and so-called “welfare states” are something of the past, 
recent events have demonstrated what had been already illustrated in 50 years of what is 
called “Social Europe”, but less clearly, namely that the European Union has remained 
unable to produce significant positive steps for fostering European-wide solidarity and 
social cohesion. Consequently, what is serious about solidarity (essentially, redistribution) 
has  remained  at  the  level  of  nation-states.  If  from  different  angles,  EU  Law  has  
strengthened individual rights in some limited areas so far, it has at the same time 
introduced “legal insecurity” for industrial relations, labour law and systems of social 
protection (Barbier and Colomb 2011). At the same time, the crucial (and not single) reason 
why systems of social protection have remained essential and national, and will certainly 
                                                             
1 Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne CNRS, Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne (CES). This text stems from a 
presentation to the Recode seminar, May 6th, 2011, CEREN, Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations and 
Nationalism, University of Helsinki. 
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not become obsolete for the foreseeable future is that these systems are both bounded 
empirically (by territory, history and language) and are based on “bonds” and “boundaries”, 
both essential to the actual and situated exercise of politics (citizenship law, reciprocity and 
identification). Politics in Europe means the use of diverse languages, and there is no 
imaginable way of circumventing this empirical fact of democracy. At the same time, the 
politicization of cross-EU matters is increasing. Hence, understanding how solidarity fares 
and will  fare  across  the  EU members  has  to  be  firmly  based  on  the  understanding of  the  
social processes at the national level, and should situate them in the wider polity of 
European integration. It is precisely at a time – the present crisis – when élites have really 
started to try and “jump over their shadows” (“über ihren Schatten springen”2), if one uses 
Jürgen Habermas’s German expression, that, with utter reluctance they are confronted most 
importantly with the language issue and the tenacious resilience of political cultures, and, 
so far, they have doggedly endeavoured to ignore it. 
This is why “solidarity”, a word perhaps not so frequently heard as it is now in the 
transnational discourse in international English, is so important to define and understand. In 
a second step, we will come to explaining why the only form of “genuine” solidarity – the 
one that implies sharing common interests and money according to social justice principles 
within  the  boundaries  of  a  defined  community,  or  society  –  has  so  far  remained  at  the  
national and infra-national levels or “scales”. In the third part of the text, we precisely 
address the role of language in the building of such solidarity. 
 
 
“Solidarity” from different angles 
 
In a period when the President of the European Commission commonly uses the term 
“solidarity” when talking about the necessary answer to the economic and financial crisis, 
very different reactions with respect to it have been heard in different countries, and in the 
absence of one single, European cross-national Öffentlichkeit, debates, although formally 
similar, have remained extremely fragmented. Let us just take two empirical examples in 
Germany and France. The term “Transferunion”3 is  a  kind  of  spectre  brandished  in  
Germany  by  the  enemies  of  a  Wirtschaftsregierung: these people contend that any 
economic government (instead of economic “governance” – Wirtschaftssteuerung can be 
one of the translations) will inevitably bring with it a “Transferunion”, meaning that 
Germany will have to pay for the weakest member states.4 In France, by contrast, the larger 
part  of  the  press  has  kept  writing  about  “solidarité” since Greece started to experience 
conspicuous problems with the financial markets and its own internal finances. The same 
has applied more or less in Italy. Various acceptations of the term “solidarity” are involved 
here, especially so when political communication (spin) is present. From a sociological 
point of view, speaking about “solidarity” thus implies some clarification from the 
beginning.  
Our intention is obviously not to go back to the history of the term “solidarity” 
across Europe, and its rich and diversified foundations across national traditions and 
languages and in sociological theory. It is simpler and more common to equate solidarity, 
as a socio-economic principle, with the ability exercised (and politically legitimated) to 
                                                             
2 In Die Zeit, November 29th, 2007. 
3 In April 2011, the conservative paper’s website Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung had a section “Europe auf dem 
Weg in die Transferunion”. 
4 Among many others, see for instance the interview of Christoph Schmidt, one of the five members of the 
Sachverständigenrat für Wirtschaft (German Group of economic experts), for Der Westen, “Transferunion stärkt 
Anti-Europäer”, February 9th, 2011. 
http://mobil.derwesten.de/dw/nachrichten/wirtschaft-und-finanzen/Transferunion-staerkt-Anti-Europaeer-
id4263891.html?service=mobile , accessed on April 2nd, 2011. 
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share collective resources (taxes, benefits and services) among citizens or individuals, as 
they are part of a community: such communities may be national, regional, occupational, 
etc. and obviously also include families. Solidarity can also happen at a cross-national 
level: it is illustrated when natural catastrophes trigger the sending of relief and aid across 
the world. Solidarity can be seen as “genuine” when it actually involves resources, whereas 
when it does not it will remain rhetorical. We shall here distinguish between four meanings: 
solidarity between states, financial redistribution at the EU level, solidarity between 
individuals in a community, and solidarity as a legal EU concept. 
 
Solidarity among states 
Solidarity among states is of a substance different from solidarity between individuals and 
members of communities: it refers to the cooperative spirit that member states (their 
governments) are able to display in certain circumstances. This may include financial 
solidarity. However, in this case, it has to be, at the minimum indirectly legitimated by 
citizens, a key point which we will analyze later. 
Take the example of President J.M. Barroso during the 2010 “Greek crisis” 
declaring to the Financial Times: “There is no stability without solidarity and no solidarity 
without stability”.5 Especially during the first stages of the “bail-out” of Greece, and later 
of Ireland, the project was not supposed to have a direct impact on the member states’ 
budgets. If the July 2011 agreement struck in Brussels about the creation of a new financial 
mechanism eventually is finally fully implemented by 2012, it will lead to introducing net 
contributions by national budgets, allowing countries in difficulties to rely on cheaper 
credit. For the first time, this will in the future not only be a form of solidarity between 
states, because national budgets will have to cover the costs of borrowing the contribution 
to the fund and this will turn into a form of financial redistribution at the EU level, our 
second category. While debate was already fierce in the Greek population and in the 
German ones (each one separated in their own public sphere, one speaking Greek the other 
German), it is not with surprise that, this debate has continued since with subsequent 
developments, especially in Germany and in Greece. 
 
Financial redistribution at the EU level 
As  anyone  knowing  the  EU  is  well  aware  of,  the  EU  budget  is  tiny  with  comparison  to  
member states’ budgets – a large part of which is devoted to expenditure earmarked for 
social protection in general (including education). Because member states roughly spend 
between one third and one half of their revenues for a “social purpose”6 (Barbier 2012), it is 
not  surprising  that  the  EU  budget  is  dwarfed  by  the  national  ones,  with  its  1%  of  GDP  
current limit. A real form of financial solidarity at the EU level is nevertheless implemented 
through the Structural Funds, and also the Common Agricultural Policy – which has always 
been centred on sustaining farmers’ incomes. These two dominant items in the EU budget 
make for about 80% of the 1%, a realistic measure of EU solidarity. In the run-up to the 
second Irish referendum about the Treaty of Lisbon, in October 2009, President Barroso 
suddenly made a trip to Limerick in Ireland to advertise the contribution of the EU to this 
country, especially in the form of a special grant attributed to redundant workers in 
Limerick: “Solidarity is one of the defining hall marks of the EU. We all know that Ireland 
has benefitted hugely from its 37 years of EU membership. To the envy of many, Ireland 
showed that it was able to take the opportunities given with both hands and to use the good 
educational levels and strong creative instincts of the Irish to turn a country of emigration 
                                                             
5 March 22nd, 2010, “Barroso demands solidarity on Greece”. 
6 Except for the poorest members, especially since the crisis has led to drastic cuts. 
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and low living standards into the success story that it is today.”7 This particular grant came 
from the “European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF)”. Before the recent 
groundbreaking decisions adopted in July and in December 2011 by the European Council, 
the fund was perhaps the best incarnation of the dire limits of solidarity at the EU level. The 
fund was agreed upon by the EU Council in December 2006, with the aim of enabling “the 
EU to show solidarity with and provide support to workers made redundant as a result of 
major structural changes in world trade patterns” [EGF amended Regulation, SEC (2008) 
3056, 16.12.2008, p. 2]. In May 2009, the number of such workers was less than 15000 
people. The European Commission later presented an updating of the EFG regulation as a 
major contribution to the fight against the economic crisis. At the time, the sheer number of 
persons concerned and the tiny amount of budget earmarked for their support (500 million 
euro, of which about 10% had been spent) vividly illustrated the true balance between the 
national level and the EU level of governance. While this text is being written, in the midst 
of an unending crisis with redundancies and extremely high level of unemployment, 
persisting poverty rates, the EFG has not even been spent entirely.8 In  terms  of  
redistribution, proper solidarity happens mainly at the national and sometimes infra-
national levels, not to mention family solidarity. Could however one claim be that, with the 
advent of “European citizenship” introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, substantive solidarity 
has been making progress? And what of the role played by the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which has an entire chapter devoted to “Solidarity”? 
 
Solidarity and EU law, EU citizenship 
Since  the  enactment  of  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon from the  first  of  January  2009,  a  number  of  
legal scholars have been announcing that the reference now made explicit to the Charter by 
article  6  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (TEU)  was  good  news  for  European  citizens.  
However, this has meant very little so far in terms of new references to the Treaty by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, former ECJ), and extremely few, if any, 
good news for the support given to social rights. Nevertheless, the Charter has a long list of 
rights grouped in its chapter “Solidarity”. As it happens however, all these rights only 
materialize at the national level. Moreover, the Court’s brief is with economic freedoms, 
and increasingly, its case-law has come against the preservation of national systems of 
social protection (Barbier 2012; Scharpf 2010; Barbier and Colomb 2011). Given that the 
general principles of the Charter were drawn from already existing international 
conventions and national legal traditions, the prospects of solidarity extending through EU 
law have remained extremely limited so far. 
Additionally, at the EU level, unlike at the national level, citizenship – particularly 
social citizenship – is effectively “embedded” into the freedom of movement of persons; a 
right which could at the same time be said to be economic or “fundamental” (a civil right if 
we use Marshall’s classification). This is why, since its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, 
European citizenship has de facto remained the preserve of only a limited number among 
the citizens of Europe: those who are able to move. This is very clearly illustrated in the 
formulation of the treaty: the only social rights presented are those of migrants (art. 21.3). 
In fact, one dimension that is perhaps difficult to understand for non specialists, and 
citizens themselves, is that EU law in the area of citizenship targets situations of movement 
between member states (Rodière 2008: 195; 265). A paradoxical situation may arise when, 
for instance, a citizen does not exercise his or her freedom of movement. Then, for instance, 
he or she will not be able to claim the application of EU law in the area of family 
reunification (ibid.), nor could he or she, if the movement took place within the territory of 
                                                             
7 Speech on October 19th, 2009. See http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/speeches-press_releases/barroso-
limerick-city-council_en.htm , accessed on August 28th, 2011. 
8 €354 million was spent by July 2011 and 76,000 people supported. 
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the member state of which they enjoy citizenship. In both cases, citizens are not really 
deemed to have “moved” and they will be subject to national legislation in the domain of 
family reunification. 
The only dimension of EU citizenship which is not directly or indirectly linked to 
movement is that citizens have the right to vote for the European parliament. To this, 
protection against discrimination established in the same part of the treaty (in Part two, 
articles 18 and 19 deal with discrimination, just before article 20 deals with EU citizenship) 
may also be added – although this is not a citizenship right in the strict sense. The major 
aspect of this discrimination has been linked directly to movement – that is the prohibition 
of discrimination on “grounds of nationality”. However, the other aspect is much broader, 
because it concerns (article 19) all the most common grounds for discrimination (“sex, 
gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”). The 
ambiguous and “Janus-faced” nature of rights deriving from EU citizenship is here 
apparent: on the one hand, they pertain to fundamental rights (also present in the list of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU), and, on the other hand, they are a consequence 
of the economic freedom of movement. All the major components of EU citizenship 
concern citizens who want to move: they enjoy diplomatic protection in other member 
states, and they enjoy the right – under certain limited conditions – to reside in any member 
state of their choice. The right to vote in another member state, in either municipal or 
European parliament elections, is also strictly linked to free movement. All in all, the major 
dimensions of EU citizenship, except the right to vote for the European parliament, in 
reality concern the tiny number of people who work or reside in another member state.9 The 
main exception in terms of significant European influence on social and labour rights has 
been equality between men and women, because of the unexpected spill-over effects of the 
initial provisions in the Treaty of Rome (namely, ex-article 119, see Davies et al. 1996). 
The great majority of legal experts we have been interviewing since the 2009 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (Barbier and Colomb 2011) share the view that the 
reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (its article 6) will not substantially modify 
this situation in the future. As was already the case before the adoption and the reference to 
the Charter, in matters of human rights the Court of Justice’s case-law referred to legal 
sources originating in Member states’ legislation and constitutions, as well as to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (Council of Europe).  
Last but not least, solidarity is precisely the legal criterion par excellence that 
protects social protection schemes from being submitted to EU law and to the overarching 
principle of undistorted competition, since the famous 1993 Poucet-Pistre twin decisions: 
ironically, solidarity is protected by Europe, but also from Europe (Ferrera 2005; Barbier 
2012). Thus it is not in the small amount of funds devoted to correcting minuscule 
imbalances across the Union, nor in the protection of the rights of the European citizens 
that one will easily find substantive solidarity in  Europe:  it  is  at  the  other  levels  of  
communities, and mainly at the national one. Real, i.e. positive10 decisions, struggles, 
negotiations and compromises take place at the national level. Classic solidarity is mainly 
the stuff of the ordinary public debate at these other levels, whereas its realm seems to be 
confined to good words and spin at the EU level (Barbier 2011). This situation has many 
explanatory factors of which we will mention in more detail. The well-known argument by 
W. Streeck (1998), according to whom there exists an asymmetry between the capacity of 
business interests and workers’ organizations has certainly retained much of its significance 
today. More generally, the reluctance of national governments to abandon sovereignty over 
themes which are essential to the defending of their power positions is also to be 
considered. But both these empirically grounded arguments cannot bypass the fact that 
                                                             
9 Currently estimated at between 1 and 2% of the working age population. 
10 In the sense of the attribution of substantive and justiciable rights. 
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social protection and industrial relations systems have been preserved through continuous 
and conflicting negotiations at the national level. They were made possible at this 
particular level because voters and negotiators, in the general case speaking the same 
national language,11 felt  part  of  a  polity  that  had  the  duty  (or  could  not  escape  the  
obligation) to discuss social justice and reciprocity within its borders. We are of course 
talking here about formal politics, and we are conscious that many other forms of politics 
happen in other spheres and give different meanings to political cultures (Cefaï 2001). No 
equivalents of a national language or of a European polity in a fully-fledged sense have 
however existed so far. Although the assumption might be seen as far-fetched, I contend 
that little progress in the process of more federalization and pooling of social rights and 
obligations will be possible unless national political cultures and national boundaries of 
political communities are challenged by cultural policies. In this sense, any future extension 
of social Europe, because it is a cross-national political question, has first to be considered 
from a political culture perspective (Barbier 2012). Social protection (and solidarity) are not 
a simple and functional accumulation of programmes but they form a system of social, 
political and economic relationships embedded into an explicitly cultural dimension, and a 
“moral and political logic” (Rothstein 1998); hence there are cultural and linguistic 
preconditions for the future of any federal programmes in the area (see also Kraus 2008).  
 
 
Trust and reciprocity, nations and political cultures 
 
At the EU level, what is precisely lacking at present as an indispensable support is the 
complex and popular web of culture, practice and institutions that make solidarity (at least 
some solidarity) possible within national communities. This solidarity is also made of 
exclusion, bringing with it a contradiction that has many consequences on European 
integration, not only with regard to the “external” relations of the EU, but also with respect 
to implicit or explicit contradictions between restricted forms of solidarity (for instance 
family, or professional, or national) and “universal solidarity” (for instance the scope for 
fundamental rights). As it has been organized in Europe, social protection/solidarity was 
always based upon trust and reciprocity; the nation states provided the only relevant 
political forms to be able to achieve this in a modern and extensive way, leading to the birth 
of a complex nexus of social relationships in society that constitute social protection 
(linking family, the economy and politics – Barbier and Théret 2009). Moreover, the 
political community allows the exercise of formal politics in  one  language  (with  a  few  
exceptions where a variety of languages exist at sub-national levels – Kraus 2011). This has 
meant the birth of integrative political cultures with one specialty of welfare cultures (social 
justice), and communities closed by language, however close they are to each other12 (Van 
Oorschot et al. 2008). 
 
The sociological nation and social protection 
We should first address the question of the sociological characteristics of nations that 
explain why they are so resilient in the area of solidarity. This step leads to acknowledging 
the importance of “political cultures” for systems of social protection, which have come to 
                                                             
11 Obviously many countries in Europe are pluri-lingual/multilingual. Apart from the Belgian case, which has now 
amply demonstrated the political importance of language, while having retained (although precariously) its federal 
system of social protection so far, Spain stands out with its various languages and the power of Catalan in 
particular. Compensation mechanisms nevertheless link the regional elements of the systems and Spanish Castilian 
is the official national language, via which, at the end of the day, redistribution and social justice has to be 
discussed in formal politics at the national level, for national funded politics. 
12 To the point that even parallel debates take place without the others knowing and participating: an excellent 
example is ethnic populism. 
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provide an essential, if not the essential substance of formal politics today in Europe. Far 
from solutions to be expected from normative premises, the reasons why national activities 
keep being essential in a Europeanized context are empirical and language is a key 
ingredient of the explanation. 
It is perhaps not useless to first recall that the very concept of “nation”13 has 
remained difficult to handle and controversial in sociology. D. Schnapper once rightly 
wrote that “le national” (what is national) had a bad reputation [“le national est marqué du 
péché du national-socialisme, du Front national ou des excès nationalistes, responsables 
des guerres du XXème siècle”] (1991: 26), because it was intrinsically associated with 
empirical nationalisms and the wars they helped to foster. Some, such as R. Brubaker 
(1996), or more recently the “cosmopolitans” (Beck and Grande 2005) seem to deny the 
possibility of a distinct analytical substance to the term.14 Brubaker systematically added 
brackets when he wrote ‘nation’, a “putative” category, which for him could describe 
neither a substantive community nor an empirical entity. He suggested distinguishing 
between ‘nationness’, ‘nationhood’ and ‘nation’, three words that do not translate easily 
into French, or into German for that matter. If ‘nationhood’ may be seen as an approximate 
equivalent of the French nation or nationalité, when one takes it as “an institutionalized 
cultural and political form”, ‘nationness’ might be an equivalent of identité (identification) 
nationale (or national identity/identification), as a process which leads people to 
experiencing some sentiment of belonging to a nation, but, for Brubaker, this is “a 
contingent event or happening” (1996: 21).  
In the real world, the main empirical base of contemporary communities is indeed 
social protection, including education, which lies at the core of political legitimacy of 
governments (Schnapper 1991: 321). The common sentiment of belonging and the 
subsequent basis it may provide for legitimizing solidarity and redistribution should not 
however be taken as automatic: it is always an empirical question to be documented. 
Moreover, as M. Weber, and later, B. Anderson have shown, democratic participation, 
economic solidarity and culture are closely linked with language. A key empirical element 
of the modern nation is that it has always been an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983), 
because “In the mind of each lives the image of their communion” (ibid: 15).  In this 
respect, ‘nation-ness’ is a subjective sentiment, a sharing of imagination empirically linked 
to language, the access to education and literacy, and it is not determined, as “culturalists” 
would have it, by ethnicity. Yet, if ‘nation-ness’ can be empirically observed, those who 
infer that its solidaristic dimension can be automatically deducted are wrong, as Weber 
stressed: “In the face of these value concepts of the ‘idea of the nation’ which empirically 
are entirely ambiguous, a sociological typology would have to analyze all sorts of 
community sentiments of solidarity in their genetic conditions and in their consequences for 
the concerned action of the participants.” (Gerth and Wright Mills 1998 [1948]: 171–179). 
Surprisingly, when it comes to analyzing systems of social protection, their 
national closure is only exceptionally taken seriously by social scientists (Ferrera 2005) and 
it is most often taken for granted, as an implicit fact. Yet, a relative closure of social 
protection has remained a clear characteristic of the building of solidarity since the 
beginnings of modern systems in the late 19th century. The “bounding” dimension is 
                                                             
13 As a sociological concept, ‘nation’ can be defined as a “communauté culturelle formée d’individus qui ne se 
connaissent pas et ne sont reliés ni par la parenté ni par une initiation spécifique du type traditionnel” which may 
have “fondements divers, ethnique, linguistique, religieux ou purement historique” [A cultural community 
grouping individuals who don’t know one another and are not linked by kinship or any traditional specific 
initiation rites (..), which may have various foundations, ethnic, linguistic, religious or merely historical] (Leca 
1992: 653–654) (my translation). 
14 Going even further, Ulrich Beck skilfully organized a methodological coup-de-force in apparently persuading 
many researchers that there was such a value-free concept as “methodological nationalism”. On the contrary, 
despite the very desirable goal of escaping the limits of a narrow national approach, the use of the concept is 
overwhelmingly made in order to allow for a unilateral discarding of all things national. 
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associated with the “bonding” of citizens, and the possibility of ‘sharing’ something 
between them. Many characteristics that pertain to the nation, as a bounded community, are 
indispensable for solidarity to merely exist: territory, nationality (or nationhood) – in the 
sense of nationalité, or Bürgerschaft – residence, language, citizenship, identity – as the 
shared sentiment of belonging to a community, and identification – as the process of 
identifying with such a ‘collectivity’ (collectivité historique, to use Schnapper’s 
vocabulary). The propensity to share between its members is at the same time individual 
and collectively constructed (Rothstein 1998).  
First, nations provide frameworks for the daily legitimating of choices and 
collective actions aimed at the collection, the allocation and the redistribution of public 
money, linked to a complex process of identification of individuals. Despite the 
Europeanization of politics under many guises, as is empirically obvious, these choices are 
only  distantly  affected  by  what  happens  at  the  EU  level.  As  has  been  shown  by  many  
studies, support for redistribution ultimately lies in the possibility for individuals to 
appraise the “moral” justification of their contribution, including the sentiment of 
reciprocity. Individual assessments would be impossible were the existence of a (national) 
political community not granted, with actual institutions for a debate usually conducted in 
one language. Moreover, the building processes of solidarity in societies involve the role of 
identifications with the national political systems that provide an indispensable and 
pragmatic support – i.e. sentiments of formal belonging to a particular community, 
notwithstanding the multiple identifications that individuals may acquire. For social 
protection decisions to be taken and legitimated, individual and collective (from parties, 
associations, from the unions, from the business associations) support is needed, be it 
implicit or explicit. A public sphere – to use Habermas’s Öffentlichkeit concept – along 
with specific policy community forums and decisional arenas are necessary to debate these.  
Secondly, citizenship matters immensely for social justice. Access to social 
protection is (at least notionally) extended to permanent and regular residents (or denizens), 
among whom some are close to acquiring fully-fledged rights (and obligations) if they gain 
full citizenship. Thirdly, the very possibility of solidarity and sharing has remained national 
in another, trivial,  sense, and from a triple perspective: the sharing of a national language 
(in exceptional federal cases inter-comprehensible languages); a firm anchoring into a 
national territory with formal institutions and organizations; a legal system, which – despite 
its subordination to a higher European legal order – remains national-specific and links 
citizenship, nationality, rights and obligations (in a national legal system). A trivial aspect 
of social protection in practice is generally overlooked: there is no such thing as social 
protection without an administration, and every administration speaks one national 
language – or, exceptionally, a handful of official languages. Law (national) is not only a 
way of ascribing an identity to individuals. It provides the ultimate and formal way of 
stating and confirming the legitimacy of the particular arrangements that decide that such 
and such a category is eligible to such and such protection or support. No equivalent 
procedures can be imagined at the EU level, and this explains, although to various extents, 
why voters rejected the documents they were asked to approve in successive referendums: 
in the Danish case in 1992, in the Dutch and French cases in 2005, and in the Irish case in 
2008. In the near future, this situation will remain unchanged, and will provide a potent 
constraint for the possible developments of any new layer of social protection at the EU 
level, a problem that now begins to be considered as crucial even by the classic enemies of 
federalism.15 Indeed  all  this  should  not  come  as  a  surprise  when  one  looks  back  to  the  
length of time over which the closure of national systems of social protection and of 
industrial relations has been in force, since the end of the 19th century (Ferrera 2005: 37–
52). There exists a basic rationale for systems to remain national, both in terms of 
                                                             
15 The Economist has started to ponder about what it calls “a convergence of social contracts” in the European 
Union [“The euro’s existential worries”, May 8th, 2010, p. 34]. 
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legitimacy and in terms of practical feasibility. The situation can be further explored 
through looking at the importance of “traditions” that belong to political cultures (Barbier 
2012). The empirical approach of the elements of sociological nations that are relevant to 
understand the contemporary bases of solidarity at various levels is purposely 
underestimated by scholars who like to describe themselves as “cosmopolitans”. However, 
sociologists, for professional reasons, should be faithful to their field work: that they take 
seriously the sociological characteristics they observe does certainly not justify their being 
thrown into the dreaded category of retarded nationalists and unreconstructed particularists. 
Similarly, “cosmopolitan” sociologists cannot lay claim to superior enlightenment as an 
excuse for trying to sell their normative preferences as sociological truth. 
 
 
Solidarity and the politics of languages 
 
To our knowledge, however, no researcher has denied the fact that language is essential for 
politics. No politics can happen without exchanging words and arguments in a particular 
language: this empirical fact is so evident that it is often taken for granted.16 Additionally 
and conversely, European élites – all sufficiently proficient to speak English on top of their 
langue maternelle, if not able to speak more languages – tend to forget two things: (a) that 
ordinary citizens are prone to experience difficulties to understand political issues in other 
languages than their own Muttersprache, and (b) that various types of politics exist within 
the borders of the EU, one being “national politics” happening in national Öffentlichkeiten 
(public spaces) bounded by language, and another one being “European politics”, taking 
place in trans-national forums and arenas at the EU level: within the limits of these arenas 
and forums, only élites do participate. At the same time in communities that are part of 
federations, in “regions” or “states”, languages different from the formal national idiom do 
play a central role. Far from reinforcing the assumption that language does not matter for 
politics, they tell the opposite. 
What we will stress and illustrate in this last section is that, despite the fact that 
languages are close to each other, the discussion of solidarity (or social justice) cannot 
happen without two empirical conditions, which are (perhaps, unfortunately) indispensable: 
discussing social justice means identifying the type and number of “others” that one shares 
with,  and this  discussion,  in  order  to  be  actual,  has  to  happen in  one  language.  The  only  
other alternative would be to discuss about social justice in English, not only in the UK or 
Ireland, but across all Europe. This is an impossible circumstance for various reasons that 
we will now review. The dire impossibility of discussing social justice/solidarity questions 
at the EU level has had the consequence that these discussions have been constantly 
avoided since the beginning of the European communities. 
The recent debates that started in many countries with the “Greek crisis” have 
vividly illustrated the side effects of what can be seen as an exercise in denegation (or 
denial) by élites17 and again demonstrated that, in the absence of other public policies, such 
debates will not be possible. Two among many symptoms of this situation are the parallel 
rise of a discourse about “populism”, as a form of elite-inspired critique depreciating a 
variety of reactions among voters, on the one hand, and, on the other, the problematic 
increase of actual votes for the far-right parties, and especially for ethnic-based populist 
                                                             
16 Interestingly, Calhoun (2007), who seems to discover that “even English is not neutral” (p.17) rightly notes that 
the use of a language is a process often devoid of intention  (ibid.: 22). 
17 Among others one of the best illustrations of such denial was the negotiation about the preamble to the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Whereas the French wanted to oppose the insertion of any mention 
of religion, the French translation talks about the “patrimoine spirituel et moral”; the English “the moral and 
spiritual heritage”; but the German decided to keep religion and persuaded the linguists-jurists of the Council of 
the EU: “ihres geistig-religiösen und sittlichen Erbes”.  
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parties – like the Front national in France, the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, or the 
Perussuomalaiset (True Finns/The Finns) in Finland. We will illustrate this point briefly by 
some examples taken from the “implicitly” trans-national debates held about the question 
of “bailing-out” other EU countries: though actually, except among a tiny élite of activists 
and networks, the debates were never trans-national, but just happening at the same time in 
different settings. 
The problem has never lied in the fact that languages, especially in Europe, are so 
different from one another. Linguistics and literature are here to teach us that the reality is 
exactly the opposite. The ever and ever documented possibility of translation here provides 
a very strong testimony (Eco 2003). Writers and specialists of translation even often 
postulate that languages are ontologically related. This is for instance the case of F. 
Hölderlin, who writes in die Aufgabe des Übersetzers: “es besteht darin, dass die Sprachen 
einander nicht fremd, sondern a priori und von allen historischen Beziehungen abgesehen 
einander in dem verwandt sind, was sie sagen woollen”.18 By analogy, within the 
boundaries of Europe, the situation is similar with regard to political cultures, and with 
European values, as I have shown elsewhere (Barbier 2012). As a consequence, all 
arguments are perfectly sound that claim that the various nations that make the EU discuss 
similar questions, and basically ground these discussions upon very similar values. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Swedes never discuss directly with French people, and 
do not decide collectively with German people about what is, for example, the “fair” age 
for retiring, precisely the question that the financial crisis has put on the table between 
Greece  and  Germany,  and  in  the  EU  as  a  whole.  But,  largely  due  to  the  absence  of  a  
common language to discuss, the impossibility of transcending the actuality of different 
political cultures and institutions, today’s European Union appears as stymied in a catch-22 
situation. 
If solidarity is so rarely discussed at the EU level, it is because discussion 
conducted in an international language – whether a lingua franca as English is today, 
Esperanto, or any other volapük – is still impossible, except among minuscule groups, some 
activists, experts and elite politicians. Obstacles regarding the possibility of discussing 
solidarity in English in Europe are the more manifest today, notwithstanding the tenacious 
efforts of Van Parijs (2002) and de Swann (in Raisons Pratiques 2001), two among the 
most famous proponents of the generalization of English for economic reasons. With an 
(apparent) ignorance of the invaluable treasures of human productions brought forward by 
the diversity of languages, Van Parijs (2002) evaluates languages from the point of view of 
utilitarianism.19 This leads him to state that there exist “wrong languages” (2002: 60) and to 
ponder what sort of “rent associated with having one type of linguistic competence” homo 
oeconomicus might want to invest in. His theory is that the generalization of English is the 
most cost-effective strategy, and he contends that “the collective value of undoing the 
multilingual outcome of the Babel fiasco is significantly less than that of maintaining a 
significant degree of linguistic diversity” (ibid.: 63). However, despite the lack of interest 
from mainstream economists for the topic, this view has been successfully challenged by 
some economists. F. Grin (2005) is among them, who has constantly argued both that 
languages are not to be seen as merely economic resources, and, that the “all-English” 
solution is not the most cost-effective, to use utilitarian vocabulary. Economic analysis does 
not automatically lead to the conclusion that multilingualism amounts to “economic 
handicaps” (Van Parijs 2004: 17), or that the future is exclusively reserved for “super-
                                                             
18 The quote is from Antoine Berman (1999: 96). 
19 P. Van Parijs (2011) has considerably enlarged his approach toward languages in his latest book about what he 
calls “linguistic justice”. However, this does not alter his basic utilitarian economic approach of languages and his 
preference for English as “a solution, not a problem”. 
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central” languages like Chinese and a “hyper-central” one like English. Therefore, it does 
not seem unrealistic to reject the argument that, since “widespread multilingualism” would 
be reserved for “a limited elite composed of highly educated individuals”, what is needed is 
“a language of communication”, namely English, “because democracy in Europe . . . seems 
to demand it” (de Swaan in Raisons pratiques, 2001: 51–54). Eventually, because he is 
aware that much injustice goes with the mere extension of English as one single language 
in Europe, P. Van Parijs (2010, 2011) proposed to settle the matter by “allowing” 
Europeans to keep talking to their mother and father in their mother-tongue, and enjoy the 
protection of “territoriality regimes”, provided that people across Europe would be using 
English in the most important, sophisticated and international aspects of life, including of 
course at university. We are unfortunately not able to discuss the credibility of this thesis 
here. However, leaving aside the enormously important issue of “linguistic injustice” for 
politics at the EU level, many invalidating empirical obstacles exist that prevent organizing 
political debate in English.20 Two essential arguments should be mentioned here. One is 
linguistic competence, the other is the intrinsic inability of English as a universal language 
to cater for the variety of meanings that politics need across Europe, and for that matter, 
across the world. 
Regarding linguistic incompetence, there are basically two contrasted assessments. 
The first, “rosy”, one is disseminated by the mainstream political communication 
instrument of the European Commission, i.e. the Eurobarometer. This instrument is used by 
all scholars, including the present author, as they have few alternative comparative data. It 
is on the basis of such data that “optimistic” and superficial assessments are continuously 
published, among them for instance N. Fligstein’s recent book (2008) (for a critique see 
Streeck 2009). Other studies however explore the proficiency of Europeans more in-depth. 
Even in the “rosy” version (latest figures to our knowledge stem from 
Eurobarometer 2006, Special EB: 243), where 56% of Europeans are deemed to speak at 
least another language, we have shown that this mean value hides immense inequality 
(Barbier 2012): among the most conspicuous, one can recall that only 9% of those that 
ended their education at 15 “know” a second language, as against those that left education 
after 20; 18% of persons living at home (mostly women) are reported as “knowing” another 
language; just as 20% of workers with a comparison of 47% of “managers”. Huge 
differences also exist between countries. However, in the “dark” version, one is not 
satisfied with a definition of “knowing” that means being able to watch TV in English and 
use English for holidays abroad – the two main situations quoted by people who told 
Eurobarometer interviewers that they “knew” another language. With surveys that 
endeavour to measure whether people master English in a proficient manner, things look 
very different. Even leaving apart “old people” (i.e. after 64), only 13% of “adults” (25–64) 
are considered “proficient” by Eurostat statistics: in Bulgaria, they are 6.5% and 5.8% in 
Hungary, while in France they are 5.1% and in Germany 21.3%. Optimistic people will add 
people who are considered “good” according to Eurostat standards,21 and the EU mean will 
then be 30%. This figure is indeed very different from the rosy one.  All in all, the essential 
fact remains that for one to fully participate in politics one has to be proficient in the 
language of the exercise: even admitting that people who can “fairly” describe events can 
be seen as able to do politics – which is of course extremely far-fetched, that figure means 
that two thirds of Europeans would be excluded if debates and polls were held in English. 
This is amply sufficient for ruling out English as a possible candidate for the exercise of 
                                                             
20 Not to mention its purported variant called international English. François Grin rightly notes that, contrary to 
some allegations, English variants are still English (Grin 2011). The argument also provides a strong refutation of 
de Swann’s (2001) argument according to which English could be “de-Englicized”, an argument that also seemed 
to convince Bourdieu once upon a time. 
21 These possess “the ability to describe experiences and events fairly fluently and able to produce a simple text” 
(Eurostat, newsrelease, September 24th, 2010, STAT/10/139). 
Jean-Claude Barbier  12 
RECODE Online Working Paper No. 01 
February 2012 
ISSN: 2242-3559   
politics in the EU, and one is back to considering that politics will still go on in the various 
languages, even in the likely case that young people will be increasingly English-speaking 
in the future.22 
A third obstacle for the future of any political processes to happen in English at the 
EU level – or, for that matter, in any of the languages of Europe that are spoken 
significantly outside their country of origin – is the fact that politics is an activity that is 
intrinsically based on the very complexity of language and meanings, on the common use 
of connotation, affective undertones, wit and humour. Witty politicians or politicians who 
convey affective meanings toward their voters are often able to be elected, even able to 
capture the votes of voters who – despite a relatively low level education background – 
fully share a variety of political experiences, connotations, words, taboo words and 
mythical ones. If one assumes that this linguistic experience constitutes an indispensable 
ingredient of politics, one is bound to think that naming and misnaming things is a key 
element of political activity. The real importance and resilience of multilingualism/ 
plurilingualism in federal countries, in particular, is a further testimony of this reality. 
 
Lessons of the “Greek and the Irish crises” for European solidarity 
Let us end up this discussion with the mention of a handful of examples to finally illustrate 
the dysfunction of the present EU polity, and its radical inability to provide instruments for 
genuine political exchange between European citizens, European parties, and European 
nations. In the present circumstances, the life of a political community is marked by 
collective references to public debates that are constantly related to meanings accumulated 
in history. Many meanings indeed travel and are translated. However, while it would be 
preposterous to equate the substance of politics with public debates present in the press, in 
the media, and on the internet, these debates function as key and shared signals that 
organize the ordinary formal life of a political community. They convey images, 
aspirations, ideas, concepts, parts of narratives, milestones. 
The Greek and the Irish “crises” have provided numerous instances of the 
importance of languages and the concurrent (and unfortunate) impossibility of European 
people to speak to each other, either individually or collectively, as political actors. 
Recently, the most controversial situation certainly arose between “the Greeks” and “the 
Germans”: actually it was as if the debate was conducted between blind and dumb people: 
German papers printed utterly depreciative statements about “the Greeks” (“Betrüger in der 
Eurofamilie” was one common line), while Greek papers were accusing “Germany’s fourth 
economic Reich” (“4ou PȐix”). The basic controversial point is precisely the issue 
discussed here, i.e. the possibility of building solidarity, of sharing. In the period started in 
January 2010, well after “the Greeks” were forced to suffer and accept a harsh austerity 
programme, a significant proportion of the German population did not accept to share with 
“the Greeks” and believed that “the Greeks” retired about ten years earlier than “the 
Germans”: despite the well established inaccuracy of such beliefs, they are the stuff of 
politics, and both people, the Greeks and the Germans had no way of speaking to one 
another. They were left with a single solution: speaking with their own folks and holding 
their government to account (Greece and Germany are democracies and voters are able to 
be heard regularly). While in repetitive polls, more than three quarters of the Germans and 
the British people were seen hostile to any “bail-out” of Greece, French people were 
favourable in their great majority (66%).23 Convincing  the  Germans,  the  Greeks  or  the  
                                                             
22 This is indeed a questionable assumption, because it is based on the hypothesis that young people will retain 
their linguistic skills when they grow older. The assumption that they will be more mobile in the future, thus 
fostering more knowledge of English and of languages in general is not however substantiated by the example of 
Erasmus students. 
23 The French figure is from an IFOP survey (May 2010). The German and British figures are from a survey 
published in March 2010 by the Fondation pour l’innovation politique. 
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French is a process that eventually falls on their respective government, and where the 
impact of the European Commission is marginal.  
 
 
Conclusion: democracy and multilingualism 
 
It took the Greek, Irish and Portuguese “crises”, and their repetitive illustration of an 
impossibility of communication between the peoples of Europe to disturb only some high 
level officials and politicians in Europe and to remind them that language matters were still 
important. Apparently, it was recently Jacques Delors’s case. In an interview, the former 
President of the Commission said that the agreement between A. Merkel and N.Sarkozy 
was unfortunately superficial; he contended that for the French-German “entente” to be 
effective:  “L’essentiel c’est avant tout que les Français et les Allemands se comprennent, 
acceptant leurs personnalités différentes, et arrivent à les additionner pour le meilleur. Ce 
qui implique davantage de pratique des deux langues des deux côtés de la frontière, ce qui 
implique plus de jumelages entre les écoles, les universités, les communes, les régions et ce 
qui implique un langage franc, mettant les choses sur la table. Et on ne demande pas à 
l’autre d’être comme nous”24 [It is essential that the French and the Germans understand 
each other and succeed in combining their different national characters for the best. This 
implies the increased practice of German and French on both sides of the borders, twinning 
together towns and schools, universities and regions. This will not be achieved without 
openness and candidness of language between peoples that should not expect to be exactly 
similar  to  one  another].  If  Jacques  Delors’s  view  is  right,  it  leads  us  to  the  normative  
recommendation in favour of multilingualism (see Kraus 2008) and of learning languages. 
What  is  necessary  for  the  French  and  the  Germans  according  to  him  is  also  obviously  
necessary for the other peoples of Europe. Unfortunately, élites in Brussels and in the 
capitals of Europe have shown few signs of having met their chemin de Damas (Damascus 
conversion) in matters of language politics and their attitude has remained an implicit 
denial of the problem. True, difficulties lying ahead are enormous. Imagine that, instead of 
the toothless and hollow communication “English” professional translators are obliged to 
use for the Commission’s website, they had to explain the complex substance of politics in 
many languages. To the French, for instance, they would have to explain that a 
gouvernement économique is not economic governance, and certainly more than Steuerung; 
they would have to explain that Wirtschaftsregierung in  Germany  is  a  matter  of  fierce  
debate; nuances would be needed, and time, to explain to the French or the Italian people 
the subtlety of the German differences between a bundesstaatliche Ordnung and a 
bundesstaatliche Regierung;25 they would also have to explain to British people what a 
Transferunion, and to the French what a “superstate” and a “nanny state” are; accordingly 
astonished readers in Britain would perhaps discover that l’Europe sociale is not a four-
letter word. They also would have to explain to M. Erdo÷an that “assimilation” has not the 
same meaning in French and in Turkish, and that when he compares it to “a crime against 
humanity” in German, he should explain more26. In any case, such processes will take a 
very long time. National governments will remain in charge of convincing their citizens 
that some form of solidarity is necessary in Europe, but they will have to convince them 
each in their own languages and within their separated political communities and 
                                                             
24 Euractiv web site, interview, April 7th, 2011, “Jacques Delors: l’alliance franco-allemande est ‘l’arbre de vie’ de 
l’UE”, www.euractiv.com, accessed April 9th, 2011. 
25 On this see for instance the discussion in Die Zeit, March 31st, 2010. 
26 “Asimilasyon bir insanlik suçudur” were his words when he visited Köln in February 2008. In April 2010, the 
Turkish Prime minister made controversial declarations in the Council of Europe’s assembly, implying that laiklik 
was better than laïcité... and making a claim for the initial French IIIrd Republic’s conception. 
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institutions. This is what Wolfgang Schaüble recently stated with great realism: “Es sei 
möglich, dass als Lehre aus des Euro-Schuldenkrisis die Notwendigkeit einer weiteren 
Integration hin zu einer politischen Union erkannt werde. Davon müsste dann aber erst die 
Bevölkerung überzeugt warden”.27 Precisely when European élites seem to have walked 
giant steps in the direction of more consistent federalism, they will inevitably stumble upon 
the question that they have their own Bevölkerung to convince.  
As specialists of languages have long demonstrated, there exists close links 
between politics, language and solidarity at the level of national political cultures today. If 
language offers the basis for all political activity, logically, an idiom should also provide 
the foundation for a European political activity which was not limited to the strategic 
functioning of the “oligarchic” inter-state control that has been exercised for the past fifty 
years by essentially English-speaking administrative and political élites. The language of 
democratic politics allowing the participation of all citizens cannot be unique.28 Rather, it 
must be a plural idiom (i.e. with a multiplicity of languages varying according to 
geographical situations – Kraus 2008), and this rules out the instrumental facility of the sole 
use of “international” English as anything other than a code of functional communication. 
But  this  is  another  subject  to  explore  for  the  future,  even before  English’s  fate  as lingua 
franca is decided with the return of Babel (Ostler 2010).   
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